Having the intelligence relations between two major
Having said that, no existing work on OSS has really addressed the experience of any OSS mission in terms of the trend identified by Andrew and Dilks, or provided ? comprehensive analysis of all the major OSS branches in their activities. The question of overall OSS significance to the war effort also remains largely unresolved historiographically. This present study therefore strives to detail OSS/London’s evolution and activities comprehensively, and to establish their larger significance to the institutionalization of American intelligence after the war.
The third major research goal flows naturally from the second: to illuminate this alliance intelligence relationship within the larger framework of Anglo-American ‘competitive cooperation’. This phrase was coined by David Reynolds to describe how Britain and America acted in concert as circumstances required, while still maneuvering for advantage and preeminence as powers.
Linking this phenomenon with the ambiguity, ambivalence, misuse and circumstance inherent in intelligence operations as suggested by intelligence theory invites an analysis of the intelligence relations between two major wartime powers, or more bluntly, to place this intelligence study within the context of Great Power politics. (Anthony 2002 122-56) Literature review ? number of key questions will be addressed while fulfilling these purposes. How many of the theoretical problems of intelligence were faced by members of OSS/London during the war?
How did the outpost establish itself, and did it mature? Was OSS/London persistently amateur, or did it make the most of its opportunities and flourish as well as could be expected? Did OSS/London reflect the popular portrait of Anglo-American intelligence relations (i. e. , American dependence), or of Anglo-American relations in general (i. e. , British dependence)? In other words, the popular portrait of Anglo-American relations has as its theme Britain’s gradually increasing dependence on American power in the first half of this century, especially from 194o onwards.
Conversely, the popular portrait of Anglo-American intelligence relations during the war, with the establishment of OSS, stresses the dependence of American intelligence neophytes on the worldly-wise, yet perfidious, British. The issue at hand is thus whether OSS/London’s evolution conformed to either, or both, of these characterizations at various points in time. For example, did the evolution of OSS/London change as US power made it felt in the European Theatre from 1943 onwards? ” (Paul 2001 38-77)
“Did Britain’s growing subordination to US power develop in the intelligence sphere as it did in diplomatic and military matters? Finally, how far did mutual hidden agendas and priorities figure in the western intelligence alliance during the Second World War? To what extent was OSS/London trying to exploit its ties with British services for their own long-term bureaucratic needs, and how extensively were the British intent on using organizational links, including intelligence cooperation, to influence the application of American power for British ends?
These latter questions focus on the motivations and agendas of the intelligence agencies themselves, as will be detailed in the chapters that follow; the evidence indicates that OSS/London was not necessarily slavishly subordinate or dependent on British intelligence. It in fact walked ? fine line between absorbing intelligence skills from the more experienced British while trying to prove the organization’s worth and independence in order to secure its post-war status.
The British, moreover, certainly extended their tutelage in order to win the war efficiently, but with the transition to cold war, Anglo-American intelligence ties were in turn exploited to mobilize American power to suit British purposes, in part by influencing the character of American intelligence so as to shape how America perceived evolving Great Power issues, Answering these questions involves ? unique application of intelligence theory to ? particular intelligence organization with ? manageable historical lifespan.
“? hush fell over the Timorese. Those in the back could run, but the thousands of people in front were trapped by the cemetery walls that lined both sides of the road. The main sound was the rhythmic thump of boots hitting the road as the troops marched in unison toward the people”. (Amy 2004 2)