The technology of military equipments becomes obsolete, thus it has to be upgraded; otherwise it becomes extinct. Military Modernization definitely is dependent on the security needs of the place. The degree of modernization must be right, because will not serve its purpose if it is deficient, but it will also be a waste and very expensive, if it is overdone. The financial capability of the country must be taken into account also, in planning modernization. Uneven degree of development in modernization will tend, for those who have the superior force, to bully, maybe just diplomatically, their neighbors who are less capable.
But this could be minimized thru diplomatic arrangements with other friendly nations. Modernization is a very expensive project. For a poor country to aspire for military “luxuries” is not practical. What it could just do is to acquire these it needs most. If not remedied, military capability inequalities will produce “military ghettos”. But these could be prevented by mutual cooperation, between regional groups, and with the help of some international groups. Qn 1: Examine the proposition that there is only one model of military modernization – a sort of to modernize or become obsolete (possibly even extinct) model.
Is this necessarily correct? Definitely, this proposition is correct. The technology, on which the military equipments were based, gradually becomes obsolete; thus, must be updated. Due to this, modernization of the military equipments of the armed forces of Southeast Asian countries is necessary. 2 For some countries, this is an immediate concern; for some it could be implemented not to the fullest; and for some – there is no need for it. The economy and politics of the area have to be considered, as to degree of military modernization needed.
Military modernization could be classified into equipments and trainings for- against external aggression, or against internal insurgency. 7For the majority of the Southeast Asian states, technology answers the problem of technological obsolescence. With the exception of Thailand, the military hardware in the Southeast Asian arsenal were inherited from their former colonial masters when they became independent after 1945.
By the late 1970s, operating and maintaining such hardware became a serious problem, as metal fatigue and the lack of spare parts made existing military hardware very difficult to operate. Given that a typical weapon system life cycle is about 20 years, it is inevitable that these equipment would need to be replaced cyclically. As such, many of the acquisitions in the region can be ascribed to the replacement or modernization of aging capabilities. Qn 2: Should there be a correlation between security concerns and military modernization? Or do states have to keep pace with the global cutting edge of military technology? 3
Military capability must be dependent and proportional to the needs of the situation. Only the very rich countries could afford to overdo military modernization, because this thing is very expensive. American security planners rediscovered Southeast Asia as a front in the war against terrorism. Southeast Asia is important from a military perspective for many reasons: its strategic location, its importance as a counterweight to China, and its large Muslim population, which makes the region an important front in the global fight against terrorism.
There is a need for a comprehensive U. S. security strategy for the region that addresses the pervasive sense of Muslim grievance, which jihadists have exploited, and that takes seriously the Chinese strategic challenge in Southeast Asia. The unspoken notion is the perceived need to safeguard against China’s growing military power, which might someday, takes on a more aggressive foreign policy toward its smaller regional neighbors. The relationship between the United States and China is beset by ambiguity.
China’s emerging role is often compared to that of imperial Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, the implication being that a strategic confrontation is inevitable and that the United States had best prepare for it. Military imperialism is not the Chinese style. China seeks its objectives by careful study, patience and the accumulation of nuances — only rarely does China risk a winner-take-all showdown. China’s growth in power coincides with the contemporary disappearance of the strategic threats–from Russia in the north and west and Japan in the east– that have historically constrained the Middle Kingdom.
This has left Beijing with the latitude to assert its ambition–an ambition that has a natural strategic focus. China’s rise poses a multifaceted strategic challenge to the region. For China, Southeast Asia is an arena of opportunity: geographically proximate, economically attractive, and historically subordinate with influential resident Chinese populations. Chinese security analysts see Southeast Asia as the weak link of the U. S. effort to contain China. China-Japan relations constitute a long-running and dangerous conflict.
The relations are not immune to positive change, but they are constantly vulnerable to backtracking and intensification of rivalry. Both kinds of changes have occurred since normalization of relations in the early 1970s. Because China- Japan conflict operates at so many levels—it is at once structural, societal, psychological, and of course political—any effort to move it toward reconciliation needs to look at both policies and processes. Moreover, we should be audacious in thinking of reconciliation as involving something more than “simple coexistence. ”